According to the Oxford Dictionary, a debacle is defined as “a sudden and ignominious failure; a fiasco.” Few events in history encapsulate this definition as well as the sudden and ignominious resurgence of the Taliban, their reconquest of Afghanistan, the haphazard American withdrawal which left hundreds of U.S. citizens and thousands of Afghan allies to the mercy of ruthless Islamists, and the senseless murder of thirteen brave American servicemen at the hands of a suicide bomber. Yet, the word “debacle” still does not fully illustrate the true picture of the inexcusable 20-year failure in Afghanistan. This failure, of course, does not belong to the brave members of the United States Armed Forces who fought, bled, saved lives, and gave theirs in battle. Rather, it is a failure directed from the highest echelons of the Washington bureaucracy that can almost be traced to the conflict’s very beginning.
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the United States oriented itself toward one common objective: find those responsible for the murder of 2,977 innocents on that day of infamy, and wipe them from the face of the Earth. After the Taliban refused to accept American requests for the extradition of Osama bin Laden and expulsion of al-Qaeda, Operation Enduring Freedom began on October 7, 2001. In a matter of months, the Taliban had been driven out of power, and al-Qaeda had been decimated. Disappointingly, in the aftermath of the Battle of Tora Bora, it became clear that bin Laden had slipped away and fled the country.
Despite having failed to meet its objective for the invasion, the United States would remain in Afghanistan for 20 years. Under UN Security Council Resolution 1386, the U.S. would join an International Security Assistance Force mandated to maintain security. The U.S. had thus been drawn in to assisting the creation of a new government in Kabul. This freshly created responsibility was further complicated by the launch of an insurgent campaign by the Taliban in 2003.
While undoubtedly a cliche, Afghanistan’s reputation as the “Graveyard of Empires” proved terribly accurate when it concerned the Taliban insurgency. The ISAF faced the task of eliminating an insurgent force from mountainous terrain, which blended in seamlessly with, and was often supported by, the civilian population. It certainly did not help matters that the Taliban continued to receive funding and training from the Pakistani intelligence service, the ISI. Inexplicably, the U.S. contributed over $5 billion in aid to Pakistan as the country continued to support the very terrorists killing our troops.
Exacerbating these already dismal circumstances, questionable strategic decisions put American troops in untenable positions. Outpost Keating represents one of the most egregious examples of poor decision making from the top. In 2006, it was posited that the creation of outposts in the Kamdesh region would project the credibility of the new government and allow for provincial reconstruction efforts. Outpost Keating was one of these bases, and it quickly became an object of concern for being isolated, indefensible, and unsustainable. On October 3, 2009, the outpost was attacked by the Taliban on all sides. Clint Romesha, awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his heroism during the battle, likened it to fighting in a “fishbowl” or “paper cup.” Mere days after the battle - which cost eight American lives - the outpost was abandoned and bombed to rubble to prevent it from falling to the Taliban.
More egregious than its position, the outpost at Kamdesh also highlighted the incompetency of many members of the new Afghan military. Despite receiving $89 billion dollars in funding, the Afghan Army was wiped out by the Taliban within the space of a month. A cursory examination reveals why. 80 percent of recruits were illiterate, resulting in significant time being devoted to teaching literacy rather than combat. Corruption was also rife, with wages and resources allocated to the army being stolen by military officials. Aside from disappearing supplies, thousands of recruits were registered on paper who did not exist in reality. Worse still, members of the Afghan forces engaged in a wide variety of despicable criminal activity, including the practice of ‘boy play,’ the sexual abuse of young boys. American forces were told to turn a blind eye to this abuse, since it was a “culturally accepted practice.” Members of the Afghan forces would occasionally engage in “green on blue” attacks, which by 2020 had seen Afghan forces kill 148 coalition troops and wound 186. This was the force that coalition leaders expected to defend the country after withdrawal.
The Afghan government was not in a much better state of affairs. Apparently, 25% of the total Afghan GDP vanished through corruption in 2010. Billions of dollars in aid and donations simply vanished, undoubtedly lining the pockets of members of the fledgling government. This includes former President Ashraf Ghani, who apparently made off with $160 million as he abandoned his country to the Taliban. This exorbitant level of embezzlement was made possible by the speed and scale of funding given to the government, which prevented effective oversight to prevent the racket that developed.
Effectively, the United States had entered Afghanistan seeking justice, and found itself nursemaid to an incorrigibly corrupt government whose army was illiterate, underpaid, prone to friendly fire incidents, and whose officers were too busy stealing their soldiers’ wages and preying upon young boys to competently lead their men. Inevitably, there is little conceivable way that the United States could have extricated itself from such a situation without chaos ensuing. Even in this context, the ensuing withdrawal from the country proved nothing short of catastrophic.
The U.S. had a precedent for effective evacuation to look to. Preparations for evacuation had already been made prior to the Fall of Saigon in 1975, with the 8,000 American citizens and 200,000 at risk South Vietnamese identified prior to the evacuation, along with potential evacuation options. In a matter of days, the United States successfully evacuated its citizens, along with 138,869 South Vietnamese. However, this success would not see itself repeated in Afghanistan.
By contrast, while American intelligence pointed to a collapse of both the Afghan Army and government, the Biden administration dismissed the possibility of Afghanistan folding so quickly. On August 15, as President Ghani fled the country, the Taliban offered the U.S. control of Kabul, but Biden declined, allowing the Taliban to take control of the capitol. What ensued was nothing sort of catastrophic. Thousands rushed to the airport, pushing their way onto U.S. transport planes, some poor desperate souls holding onto the plane and falling to their deaths upon takeoff. The Taliban were given control of security checkpoints, likely contributing to the loss of thirteen servicemen. At present, hundreds of Americans and thousands of former interpreters remain trapped in Afghanistan, while tens of thousands of unvetted Afghans have been transported to the country.
To say that it is far too late to address the failure in Afghanistan would be an understatement. All that can be hoped for is to learn lessons for future foreign policy decisions; the United States should limit its involvement to its initial objective, and if this objective is not met, it should disengage. Unfortunately, considering the unchanging nature of the Washington bureaucracy, any hope that these lessons will be taken into account may well be wishful thinking.