With the rise of an authoritarian and aggressive People’s Republic of China (PRC), the United States' role as a global hegemon is increasingly under threat. The greatest potential flash point of this new great power rivalry is the island nation of Taiwan, formally the Republic of China. How the US manages China’s aggression towards Taiwan is crucial, as it will not only determine the future of the US-China relationship, but may well decide the fate of the liberal world order that has prevailed since the end of World War II. Scholars and commentators have arrived at numerous answers, ranging from making a hard commitment to Taiwanese security, to increased support for Taiwan short of a full commitment, to the abandonment of the island. With the changing security environment and importance of Taiwan to US credibility and national security, altering US policy towards a commitment to the defense of the island – strategic clarity – is the best route forward.
Taiwan is essential to American security both regionally and globally. The island is at the center of the First Island Chain (a collection of islands from Japan and Taiwan through to the Philippines and Malaysia), making it difficult for the Chinese navy to operate unfettered in the Pacific Ocean. Most of China’s central-eastern seaboard does not have any deep water ports (while Taiwan’s coast does), which forces submarines to travel at the ocean’s surface until the water is deep enough beyond the First Island Chain. Taiwan also straddles major trade routes that pass through the East China Sea, allowing the island significant control over commerce. The strategic qualities of Taiwan make it of great interest to the United States, as its occupation by the PRC could pose significant security threats to the region and allow China easier access to the high seas.
Taiwan is also important for its moral and political value. As a beacon of liberal, free enterprise democracy in East Asia, the island is a natural friend of the United States and is on the front lines of the battle against Chinese authoritarianism. The world is once again in a struggle between two opposing ideologies: a free market, liberal democratic system opposed to the Chinese model of a managed economy married to political authoritarianism. Keeping Taiwan a flourishing, independent democracy will be an important success in the eyes of the free world. The island’s tech-driven economy has also enabled it to be a leading producer of semiconductor technology. This is an asset for the United States – particularly with China competing to become the world’s preeminent technological power – and cooperation with the Taiwanese can help the American technology sector, particularly in the areas of AI and advanced computing technology.
Currently, the United States has a policy of strategic ambiguity towards the island nation whereby the United States neither commits to defend Taiwan nor declares that it will not do so. The purpose of this is to prevent China from invading Taiwan and Taiwan from declaring independence. China, not knowing if the US will enter a conflict, will choose to avoid invasion for fear of intervention, and Taiwan, also unclear about whether the US will come to its aid, will not declare independence (which would risk war).
Strategic ambiguity, by its nature, means that it is unclear if the US will intervene in a future crisis involving Taiwan. Ambiguity only functions when China is deterred by the US military and when Taiwan feels that it would lose a war with China without US support. Today, however, when China is a peer adversary, ambiguity is worthless. China believes that it can impact the US’ decision of whether to intervene through massive military preparation: the more powerful the Chinese military, the less willing the US will be to come to Taiwan’s defense. Ambiguity only signals to the Chinese that they can influence the US’s calculus, which, by consequence, will embolden them to take risks that they otherwise would not take. Indeed, China launched the largest number of incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone in October and November 2021 (196 and 159 incursions, respectively). For comparison, October and November 2021 saw a combined 68 incursions. Ambiguity also leads to the risk of miscalculation: if China thinks that it could prevent the US from entering a cross-Strait conflict by defeating Taiwan swiftly, it will be far more likely to make rash decisions about attacking the island.
Further, even with the current policy of ambiguity, if the US does not come to Taiwan’s defense, it would be devastating for America’s credibility on the world stage. Allies in the region already expect the US to defend the island, and if it refused, it would raise serious doubts about whether the US is a reliable partner. This could spell disaster for the system of alliances and the liberal world order that the US has painstakingly built since World War II. If countries lose faith in the United States, they may choose instead to work with and appease China rather than risk punishment from the PRC because of their relationship with the US.
The policy of strategic ambiguity must be implemented by an act of Congress creating a formal treaty between the US and Taiwan. Some have argued that a Presidential declaration or executive order would be sufficient. However, as Walter Lohman and Frank Jannuzzi assert, having the President issue an executive order declaring a commitment to the defense of Taiwan is a “dangerous half-measure” that, in terms of policy, does little to change the actual commitment to Taiwan. American honor would then be at stake, but that is not enough. Such a policy would be subject to the constant fluctuation of who occupies the Oval Office, which is no calming thought. America’s commitment to Taiwan must have the force of law behind it, for only then would the country’s support for Taiwan be truly unambiguous.
There are indeed significant risks in taking this step, and they cannot be discounted. Any policy of strategic clarity must be preceded by an adequate buildup of American forces in the Indo-Pacific so as to make the threat credible. Recent US wargames indicated the potential for an American loss in a China-US conflict over Taiwan given the nation’s current military position – a position that would have to be rectified before a policy of strategic clarity could be pursued. This does not need to be a deployment of tens of thousands of troops — it need only be enough to impose massive costs on a Chinese invasion effort. Long-range anti-ship missiles, a constant rotation of submarines, a strong fighter and bomber presence for targeted strikes — these would be sufficient to ensure that any invasion fleet would face steep odds while minimizing US forces’ contact with People’s Liberation Army (the Chinese military) anti-air and anti-ship defenses. US allies may be concerned about a potential American defense commitment to Taiwan, but if the US maintains a credible force in the region, that concern should be offset by reassurance.
There is concern in some quarters about a defense commitment enabling (or encouraging) Taiwan to pursue independence. While this would be true if the US made no efforts to address the concern, there are numerous other avenues that the US could take to exert pressure on the Taiwanese, both economic and diplomatic, that could deter them. The simplest policy option is for the US to make the commitment to defend Taiwan contingent upon the island not declaring independence.
The US should also combine a policy of strategic clarity with other means of support for the Taiwanese. Continued sales of arms to the island, particularly those that will inexpensively exploit Chinese weaknesses, are necessary. America should also craft tighter economic ties with the island and work to make its economy more independent of the PRC. Increased advocacy for Taiwan to the international community would also be welcome (like the invitation extended to Taiwan by US President Joe Biden to attend the upcoming Summit for Democracy), and the US should take steps to preserve the inter-state ties Taiwan has and encourage further ones. These moves will harm US-China relations, but if they come as a part of a larger rethinking of the US’s relationship with the PRC, that harm may simply be the price to pay for the preservation of both US global hegemony and that of the free, liberal world order.