After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, it has been the constant temptation of Americans to overlook or diminish the importance of the nuclear arsenal. The nation’s triad, however, is at a critical juncture, facing significant concerns over age and reliability, and falling behind near-peer adversaries. As an essential component of America’s deterrent against aggression, the modernization of the country’s nuclear forces is a strategic imperative. Equally important is the maintenance of America’s longstanding nuclear weapons strategy. President Joseph R. Biden, however, has voiced criticism over the cost and necessity of efforts to bring the triad up to date, and supports significant departures from existing strategy, calling into question the extent to which the country will be able to provide a credible deterrent well into the 21st century.
Nuclear weapons tend to be perceived in a negative light, as tools of Armageddon, devices that have no place in the modern cosmopolitan world. Such perceptions lead to calls for disarmament, for a world free of nuclear weapons, with the belief that such a circumstance would contribute greatly to world peace. On its surface, that is a reasonable contention: fewer weapons should lead to fewer lives endangered. But what is often lost in the moralistic rhetoric of undoubtedly well-meaning activists is a careful analysis of the state of world peace. The past 75 years have been unprecedented in modern history: not since the Second World War has there been a direct and major conflict between the great powers of the world. World peace is taken for granted, but a look back at the previous 500 years reveals that doing so would be a major mistake. Until 1945, a major conflict between great powers occurred at least once every fifty years, with the longest peace (43 years) being between the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 and the First World War in 1914.
It would, of course, be a vast oversimplification to claim that nuclear weapons alone are responsible for the current unprecedented peace. The maintenance of the international order established by the United States post-WWII, the spread of democracy and Western Civilization, along with the integration of world economies, have played indispensable roles. But while each of these developments serve to reduce conflict, they cannot, alone, prevent it. Nations inevitably (I use this word sparingly) have varying and often contradictory interests, making the soft power of economic and cultural integration unreliable in the maintenance of peace. Nations with opposing aims do not abide by ‘international norms’, because one's own interests — in this case the nation’s — will always take precedence over the interests of the international community. For better or worse, selfishness is what characterizes state-to-state relations. The point is that, in the end, force is the only thing standing between international order and anarchy. The potential destruction of oneself at the hands of an opponent is the strongest tool to enforce order, and by consequence, peace.
Hence the importance of nuclear weapons. Unlike conventional military strength, which, because similarly matched adversaries can reasonably assume that they will not be destroyed in a conflict, does not provide a guarantee of deterrence, nuclear weapons are the great peacemakers of international relations. There is no defense against nuclear weapons when possessed in large quantities. There can be no reasonable assumption that one will not be destroyed in a nuclear war — one most certainly will. Thus, in a world of rational actors, nuclear weapons are as close to a guarantee of peace as one can achieve. There are, of course, caveats to this. It is the responsibility of nuclear powers to take proper precautions and maintain open communications with adversaries to prevent miscalculations. In this sense, limiting the growth of arsenals is also a net positive, when kept within reason. There is a certain number of nuclear weapons that a nation must maintain for it to have a credible deterrent, which must be enough to destroy the two greatest adversaries of that nation (thus the number varies by country). For nuclear weapons to be a positive, they must be maintained at a level where adversaries know that they could never win a nuclear war. If a nation does not maintain enough, then their deterrent is not entirely credible. Therefore, having too many or too few nuclear weapons is a negative, but at roughly the right amount, nuclear weapons are the keystone of international peace.
I will not pretend to know what the ‘perfect’ number of nuclear weapons would be for the United States, but some speculation can be had. The military maintains a nuclear triad, whereby there are three separate methods of delivery: air, ground, and sea. This system was devised so that the nation always has a credible deterrent capability, because it would be nearly impossible for an adversary to neutralize all three branches of the American nuclear response. Assume that there was only one branch, sea, as there is in the United Kingdom, where the only deterrent is submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). An adversary could hypothetically neutralize that threat if they could detect the few deployed submarines (the US only has 14 ballistic missile submarines, and they are never deployed all at once), which would leave the United States without any credible nuclear response. Each branch of the triad must be capable, by itself, of providing a credible deterrent, which would mean that the US’ stockpile will have to be relatively large, certainly at least 1550, which is the limit imposed by New START (an arms limitation treaty signed in 2010 between the US and Russia). This may seem large, but one has to factor in the potential for technical failure, preemptive and counter-strikes by the adversary, and the US’ worldwide deployment, among other issues, making several hundred per branch of the triad the bare minimum. It is not worth saying much more regarding numbers, because a precise estimate would require extensive analysis not suited to an article.
While the US maintains a sufficiently large nuclear stockpile numerically at the moment, numbers can be deceiving. US nuclear forces are woefully outdated and in dire need of modernization. The land-based component, the silo-launched Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was designed in the 1960s, and is nearly 40 years past its original retirement date. They are widely considered to be incapable of continued life extension programs (LEPs), as the technology is simply too old, and essential components are out of production. The sea-based component, the Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) was designed in the 1980s, and is a few years past its original retirement date, with the current retirement date set for 2042. The air-based component, the AGM-86 air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) was designed in the 1970s, and is nearly 30 years past its original retirement date. As equipment ages, it loses its technological edge, and reliability becomes a significant concern. This equipment is delivering a weapon with massive destructive capacity, and high reliability is key to providing a credible deterrent — if adversaries suspect the delivery systems are unreliable, they are more likely to engage in provocative and dangerous behavior. Therefore, it is imperative that delivery systems are kept up-to-date and capable of meeting the needs of the present and the near future. Russia and China are quickly modernizing their nuclear forces and producing brand-new delivery systems, making the modernization of America’s arsenal a pressing concern.
The other problem facing US nuclear forces are the warheads themselves. Every warhead currently deployed was developed and tested during the Cold War, making them all at least 30 years old. Part of the problem is the inability of the US to test its warheads due to the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which leaves computer simulation and AI as the only methods by which the efficacy of the current stockpile can be assessed. There is no clear data on the impact of such extreme age (30+ years) on a nuclear core from deployed warheads, and that data is impossible to produce absent a nuclear test. Tests do not have to be open-air, they can occur underground in a ‘controlled’ setting, and do not have to be the full-yield of the weapon. There is suspicion that Russia and China have engaged in low-yield underground testing, and if this is the case, it leaves the US at an even greater disadvantage. The US is developing a new warhead, the W93, which will replace the current SLBM warheads in both US and UK inventory. While this is a positive development, the problem is that it will be developed and deployed without any testing. No one would ever use a brand new vehicle if it did not go through any testing, and this should no less be the case for a weapon that will serve as the core of US nuclear deterrence for decades. Mr. Biden also potentially has the W93 on the proverbial chopping block, which could pose serious challenges, particularly for the UK, which relies on US nuclear weapons for its own stockpile. In short, there needs to be a return to testing of nuclear warheads — this can be low-yield underground testing — if there is to be certainty about the efficacy of the US stockpile.
A final problem is the state of the US nuclear establishment, which while still very capable, is a cause for concern. According to the US Department of Energy, much of the infrastructure utilized is over a half century old, if not older: “Nearly 60 percent of facilities and equipment are more than 40 years old. Nearly 30 percent of facilities were constructed during the early Cold War era, and 10 percent are deemed excess to mission needs.” While the infrastructure can be updated or replaced with (relative) ease, the talent that is lost is a resource of far greater value and one that is much harder to replace. The US is also not producing enough plutonium pits (the cores of warheads) to replenish current stockpiles (a plutonium pit’s lifespan is estimated to be “somewhere between 45 and 60 years”) and produce the necessary warheads. Currently, the system is capable of producing around 10 per year, although this is expected to be ramped up to about 80 by around 2030. This is certainly a step forward, but Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, said in March 2020 that, “The Nation must be able to produce no fewer than 30 pits per year during 2026 and produce at least 80 pits per year during 2030 to maintain stockpile effectiveness… Any interruption or delay to pit production, due to the lack of resiliency, will have huge cost increases across the entire NSE [Nuclear Security Enterprise] in the future.” In other words, the US will be cutting it very close.
The state of the US nuclear deterrent is not dire at the moment, but if the country does not continue to commit a full-scale modernization program, it may become dire in the near future. Mr. Biden has criticized the decade-long modernization plan, which is estimated to cost between $1.2-1.5 trillion, as too expensive, and some of the procurement as being unnecessary. While undoubtedly expensive, the nuclear deterrent of the country is well worth the cost, as has been argued above. The President’s criticisms of some of the procurement programs are more precise, but equally wrongheaded. One of the most important criticism is of the deployment of the W76-2 low-yield warhead on the Navy’s Trident II D5 SLBMs. His contention is that the deployment raises the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used, because the low-yield of the warhead will make it more suitable for a response short of full-scale nuclear war. In some sense, he is correct, the deployment does provide a recourse for military commanders short of all-out nuclear war. Somewhat counterintuitively, however, this is actually a great advantage. The deployment was not conducted in a vacuum; it was in response to Russian deployment of low-yield warheads. The concern with the Russian deployment was that the US did not have a proportionate response: there is nothing that the US could use (before the deployment of the W76-2) that would serve as a proportionate deterrent to the Russian threat, which would make the Russians more likely to use a nuclear bomb, because they would know that the US would not pursue full-scale nuclear war over a low-yield attack on, say, a Carrier Strike Group — the cost-benefit analysis simply does not add up. Therefore, the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons would actually increase if the US did not deploy the W76-2, because there is not a proportionate deterrent that the US could use in response. It is better to have more options than to be relegated to choosing between defeat and full-scale nuclear war.
The AP reports that Mr. Biden’s campaign website states, “the sole purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal should be deterring — and if necessary, retaliating against — a nuclear attack.” The problem is what is excluded from this statement: current US nuclear policy states that nuclear weapons may be used in response to “significant non-nuclear strategic attacks” in “extreme circumstances.” The conclusion to be drawn from this omission is that Mr. Biden does not believe a nuclear response would be justified against, say, a serious biological or chemical weapons attack. Reducing the stated willingness of the United States to respond to a massively destructive non-nuclear attack with a nuclear response makes the country less safe. It simply encourages adversaries to turn to non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction in any potential conflict.
Mr. Biden has also indicated that he supports the US adopting a no first use policy, whereby the United States relinquishes the right to launch a preemptive strike. On the surface this position seems reasonable: the US would not want to be the first one to pull the trigger of mass destruction. But that is not the full picture. The policy of calculated ambiguity (the potential willingness to strike first) has been key to deterring adversaries from taking provocative and potentially deadly risks by creating “uncertainty in the mind of a potential aggressor about just how the U.S. might respond to an act of aggression, and this ought to reinforce restraint and caution on the part of that potential aggressor.” A no first use policy nullifies the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons in part because it incentivizes, or at least does not deter adversaries from launch significant non-nuclear strikes on US or allied assets, for they know that the US would not respond with a nuclear strike. At a time when America faces strengthening adversaries, particularly in the Asia-Pacific, adopting a no first use policy could prove disastrous. The US is ill-positioned to respond to a massive conventional strike in the Pacific, in part due to the anti-access area denial strategy of the Chinese along the first and second island chains (in short, the Chinese have so heavily fortified their coastline with long-range anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles that any approach within a few hundred miles of the eastern seaboard of mainland China would be incredibly costly). China, by contrast, would be fighting in its back yard. Should they choose to launch a conventional attack on US installations in Japan, Guam, or the like — which would be more likely without the threat of nuclear war — it would be very difficult for the US to muster a credible response. The result could very well be rapid escalation culminating in nuclear or massively destructive conventional conflict. There are no costs to having a calculated ambiguity posture — the US has full control over when and where it uses nuclear weapons, but there are significant risks in abandoning such a policy.
If it is not already clear, one of the most important facets of nuclear deterrence is its psychological effect. The threat of nuclear war is the very thing that prevents major conflict (and potentially nuclear conflict) in the first place. That threat needs to be clear and ever-present. Weakening it — by indicating, for example, that the US would be less willing to use nuclear weapons — weakens the psychological effect, which in turn means adversaries will be more willing to act in provocative and dangerous ways. The same goes for creating clearly defined characteristics of the situations where the US would launch a nuclear strike. By clearly limiting the parameters, America gives its adversaries a confident sense of just how far they can push. In a time of war, the adversary will go as far as it can to achieve victory, and circumscribing US nuclear strategy encourages the enemy to go right to the limit. If there is ambiguity around when the US would launch a nuclear strike, the adversary is forced to exercise caution and relative restraint. The key is to look at the deeper, often counterintuitive effects of policy. Good intentions do not mean that the result will be good.
In a perfect world, complete denuclearization would be a desirable outcome. Nobody wants to have weapons of such immense destruction sitting in silos or on airfields awaiting an order to begin Armageddon. But the world is imperfect, and nuclear weapons are not going anywhere. In fact, in this imperfect world, if one desires the least likelihood of another worldwide conflict, then nuclear weapons are indispensable. As a deterrent force, nuclear weapons have contributed greatly to the prevention of the great-power conflict that characterized the centuries before the end of the Second World War. The nations of the world should do all within their power to prevent rogue and dangerous regimes from acquiring nuclear weapons, but in the hands of rational great powers, they are not the force of evil that they are all-too-often branded as. The next century of America’s security will depend upon the actions the country chooses in the present day. If one wants to ensure that the US is in the best position to weather the great-power rivalry that is undoubtedly coming, then the modernization of US nuclear forces must be a paramount priority.
The Heritage Foundation’s “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Capability” report served as an important primary source reference for this article.