The consistent aid being provided to Egypt over the last three presidencies show that Egypt is regarded as critical to US interests in the Middle East. While Egypt, since President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s rise to power, has undermined human rights, it has played a large role in the US national interest in two key areas: Israel and counterterrorism. Egypt’s relationship with Israel is of paramount importance to the US, with Israel being America’s closest Middle Eastern ally. Plus, Egypt’s close proximity and history of conflict with Israel makes Egyptian-Israeli peace essential to Israeli security. After the 1979 peace treaty, Egypt and Israel went into a cold peace, where tensions remained while military conflict was eliminated. Because of this peace, Egypt was guaranteed military aid from the US, and this aid likely kept the two countries at peace. After the fall of Morsi, however, Egypt and Israel started to collaborate on many fronts, including counterterrosim in Sinai, natural gas in the Mediterranean Sea, and negotiations with Hamas in Gaza (Sharp 3). This cooperation works toward both countries’ national interests and are mostly unsolicited by the US, so it is doubtful that US aid plays a major role in this newfound relationship between Egypt and Israel (Malinowski). Had US aid been a player in this relationship, Israel and Egypt would have had this relationship since 1979; but, this relationship manifested after Sisi came to power, and especially increased after the 2020 Abraham Accords, showing that Sisi’s geopolitical strategy has more to do with this relationship than US aid (Sharp 4).
First of all, Egypt and Israel have begun to coordinate against terrorist violence in Sinai. With Sisi’s opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood, increased terrorist attacks on both Egypt and Israel, and Israel’s continued conflict with Islamist groups in Gaza and the West Bank, the two countries have a shared interest in combatting terrorism in Sinai, a region of Egypt that composes Israel’s longest internationally-recognized border. This interest is shown in Egyptian-Israeli cooperation in intelligence and military operations, with Egypt allowing Israeli airstrikes in Egyptian airspace and Israel allowing Egypt to militarize in the Sinai to fight insurgent groups (Miller 5). While this cooperation positively impacts American national interests in both Israeli security and in counterterrorism, this cooperation is mutually beneficial and unlikely to fall apart if the US withholds aid from Egypt.
On top of counterterrorism, Egypt has played a major role in facilitating negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian leaders in Gaza. This was shown in May 2021, when violence broke out between Israel and Palestine. Egypt, in an attempt to re-establish itself as regionally important, facilitated discussions between the two to come to a ceasefire. Egypt holds leverage over Hamas since the Rafah border crossing is the only land crossing not controlled by Israel (Sharp 5). Because of this leverage, Egypt maintains relations with Hamas while seeking to contain it within Gaza, and Egypt is in a place where it can help mediate between Israel and Hamas when conflict arises, like it did in 2021. President Sisi’s role in negotiating a cease-fire and helping evacuate American citizens rendered praise from President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken (Sharp 5). This role for Egypt concerning Israeli security would likely also hold should American funds be withheld, since such a role helps raise Egypt’s standing in the region, solidifies a mutually beneficial partnership with Israel, and, due to Sisi’s abhorrance for Islamist parties (he overthrew an Islamist government and banned the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013), contains Hamas in Gaza (Times of Israel).
The third way Egypt and Israel have reached a self-sustaining relationship is in natural gas production. In 2018, Israel and Egypt entered into a decade-long agreement worth $15 billion, where Israeli natural gas is exported to Egypt to be liquified and re-exported or used domestically (Sharp 7). Additionally, Egypt and Israel, along with other Mediterranean countries, have united to compete against Turkey and Libya in the natural gas industry (Sharp 7-8). This economic partnership clearly sustains itself independent of US aid, as the economic ties between Egypt and Israel help bolster both countries’ role in the region.
The second major US interest in which Egypt plays a role is counterterrorism. The first time this affected US aid to Egypt was in 2015, when President Obama released formerly withheld Foreign Military Financing (FMF) aid to Egypt. This was due to the rise in the Islamic State’s Sinai Province (IS-SP) and attacks against tourists and Copts in Egypt (Sharp 6). While the US has continued to grant aid to Egypt to fight terrorism, Egypt has contsantly undermined this battle because of its prisons, heavy-handed attacks, and unprepared military. How Egypt runs its prisons undermines the fight against terrorism in Sinai because the government groups political prisoners with ISIS-affiliated and violent prisoners, uses torture even against peaceful dissidents, gives ISIS prisoners special priveleges, and does not provide sufficient medical care (Human Rights First 3-6). Tom Malinowski states that President Sisi’s priority is not to counter terrorism, but to ensure that a 2011-like revolution never happens again, and this greatly affects how the Egyptian government handles its prison system (Malinowski). Because the government continues to hold around 60,000 political prisoners, and these prisoners are subjected to long sentences without justification and brutal torture, animosity toward the Egyptian government exponentially grows, and because ISIS prisoners are mixed with non-ISIS prisoners, terrorists are able to radicalize formerly peaceful dissidents by using government abuses as a reason for violent insurrection (Human Rights First 9; Abrams). According to Ben Rhodes, Egypt wants this radicalization to take place so that it can justify cracking down on its opposition (Human Rights First 7). This shows that the issue is not only Egypt’s prison conditions, but also the Egyptian government’s prioritization of cracking down on dissents over eliminating violent extremism in Sinai.
Another way Egypt undermines counterterrorism efforts is its heavy-handed and conventional approach to an unconventional enemy. The heavy-handed approach, including crackdowns on civilian populations and state-sanctioned violence, turns the sympathies of the Sinai populace away from the Egyptian government and toward Jihadist groups (Abrams). In addition, Egypt’s military is ill-prepared for fighting terrorism, as they have purchased weapons from France, Germany, and Russia that do not aid in fighting non-state actors like IS-SP (Abrams). Furthermore, US FMF aid has been ineffective in providing Egypt the necessary tools to defeat IS-SP. These tools are not weapons, as Egypt has more than enough weapons to win, but rather training and advice (Miller 3). Egypt’s strategy for combatting terror in Sinai is ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst. Instead of adopting the counterinsurgency tactics that were so successful in Iraq and Syria, Egypt continues to use overwhelming force against insurgents in residential communities (Miller 3). This also works to alienate the people of Sinai, making it harder for Egypt to effectively defeat IS-SP.
Egypt’s role in relation both to Israel and to terrorism shows its importance in regional affairs despite the common claim that Egypt’s significance in the region is diminished. The Israel-Egypt relationship is seemingly self-sufficient, but good relations between countries can deteriorate quickly, especially if a change in regime occurs. Such a change in regime is entirely possible, as the 2011 and 2013 revolutions happened very quickly and without warning, and Egypt remains both economically and politically unstable (Dunne). Further, Egypt is still reliant on the US for counterterrorism, though the strategy is flawed ( Miller 3). Thus, the US should not cut or eliminate aid to Egypt, but the conditions placed on aid should be increased so that the US can better ensure it is serving direct American interests and is not seen as an entitlement by President Sisi (Malinowski).
Many argue that aid should be cut or eliminated based on Egypt’s poor human rights record (Whitson 2; Human Rights First 7; Human Rights Watch 2-3). While human rights is undeniably important, attempts to get President Sisi to budge on human rights have failed time and time again. Therefore, the conditions for aid should be, at least initially, targeted toward direct American interests, such as maintaining a positive relationship with Israel and fighting terrorism, rather than unrealistic demands that will go unanswered. If the US conditions aid on achievable goals, this will increase trust between the American and Egyptian governments so that human rights conversations down the road can be more fruitful. There are some instances where human rights are of immediate American interest, such as the treatment of political prisoners (Human Rights First 8-12), the unjustified incarceration of American citizens (Katersky & Finnegan 2-3; Malinowski; Abrams), and the restrictive non-governmental organization (NGO) law (Sharp 10; Malinowski). These are directly related to American national interests, since the treatment of political prisoners breeds violent extremism (Human Rights First 1), unjustified incarceration of Americans violates our national sovereignty and hurts American efforts to aid Egypt (Malinowski), and the NGO law restricts not only American humanitarian efforts, but also Egyptian NGOs from serving the Egyptian people (Sharp 10; Malinowski). These three issues are the human rights issues the US government should emphasize the most, since they most directly relate to the national interest and are relatively reasonable compared to conditions that will likely never be met in the near future, like a requirement that democratic institutions be strengthened (Sharp 35-36).
There is some evidence that targeted conditions can work. First of all, President Trump’s withholding of $65.7 million until Egypt scaled back its relationship with North Korea and released 43 NGO workers proves that Egypt is willing to negotiate when met with cuts in military aid (BBC Report; Miller 5). The main difference between this successful action and the lack of success that is seen in all three administrations is that these demands did not directly come into conflict with Egypt’s national interest or Sisi’s personal interest. President Obama’s conditions in 2013 were unrealistic since it required a complete change in regime, which the administration realized in 2015 when faced with terrorist threats in Sinai (Sharp 35-36). Also, while President Biden’s withholding of $130 million was unsuccessful as well, and the demands were reasonable, this was undermined by the $2.5 billion arms deal to Egypt, which even though it was not purchased with FMF funds, was a case of the US providing weapons without any regard for American interests being promoted; furthermore, President Biden’s actions were undermined by the release of the remaining $170 million (Times of Israel Report). Therefore, if the United States is consistent in its conditional stance toward Egypt, targeted in its approach, and applies reasonable benchmarks, there would be more success in meeting American goals in its relationship with Egypt.
In addition, the message that Egypt is entitled to American aid hurts the US’s leverage and allows Egypt not to take American wishes seriously (Malinowski). So, the president’s waiver ability should be revoked, at least temporarily until Egypt improves. This would ensure that presidents are unable to override the Congressional restrictions on Egyptian behavior and undermine the US’s bargaining power over Egypt (Human Rights First 7). Once the US’s bargaining power is re-established, presidential waivers might be able to be reinstated based on the progress Egypt attains. However, this waiver has been used by all presidents in the name of national security to give aid unconditionally to Egypt, so this power must be taken away so that Egypt does not continue to receive an unconditional entitlement from the US government.
Furthermore, both nations have emphasized the value of a “trade, not aid” relationship in terms of economic aid (Sharp 37), so there is no reason why a “trade, not aid” relationship should not be adopted in terms of military aid as well. As stated above, Egypt does play a significant role in two areas of American interest, but in order to merit American aid, the Egyptian government must work toward, not against, American interests. Therefore, in exchange for aid, Egypt must meet certain requirements so that American aid is used to promote shared American and Egyptian interests rather than allowing Egypt to pursue policies at the expense of the national security of the United States and its allies.
Overall, the FMF aid provided to Egypt should be considerably altered. First of all, all aid should be conditioned on different points. Rather than grouping all of the US’s desires into one multi-part condition, the US should individually link items for improvement to specific amounts of money. With this, all aid should be conditional to increase pressure on Egypt and to send a message that American aid is not an entitlement, but must be earned (Malinowski). The $1.3 billion total would stay the same, but all of it should be conditional on meeting specific demands, with the percentage of aid that could be withheld being proportional to the importance to American national interests and on the necessity of the aid. 30% should be conditional on progress in its fight against terrorism with a requirement that Egypt heed American training and adopt the successful strategies used in Iraq and Syria, 30% should be conditional on prison reform, 15% should be conditional on the release of American citizens from Egyptian prisons, 15% should be conditional on the maintenance of a peaceful relationship with Israel, and 10% should be conditional on the repeal of NGO laws that adversely affect American economic and humanitarian aid.
Egypt cannot damage American interests beyond what it already has. Ruining its relationship with Israel would be self-sacrificing (Miller 5; Whitson 6-7; Abrams), and Egypt’s unsuccessful efforts to combat terrorism and prison conditions cannot be made much worse (Human Rights First 1; Abrams). Thus, if Egypt were to not acquiesce to American conditions on aid, Egypt’s interest would be hurt more than the US’s (Miller 5; Whitson 7). While Egypt has turned to Germany, France, and Russia in the past to purchase weapons, the US’s FMF aid allows Egypt to buy high-tech weapons with American money rather than its own (basically free weapons), and Egypt (Sharp 33), through its relationship with the US, gets access to foreign markets (Miller 5). This means that Egypt needs the US much more than the US needs Egypt, and the US should promote this attitude. Another reason the US should not concern itself with Egypt’s relations with other countries in terms of weapons purchases is that Egypt constantly uses both Russia and the US as political tools to get more from both of them, and America’s free high-quality weapons and access to the global market make the US indispensable to Egypt (Miller 5).